The Role Of The German Economy In Europe And The World

This essay was written on November 16, 1998, at the end of the Kohl era in Germany and what proved to be some eight years of socialist party government, years in which the eurozone economy has staggered along at around 1% growth rates. In retrospect, then, many of the predictions made in the essay materialized in the event.

The Role of the German Economy in europe and the World

The likely impact of the new Schroeder government’s economic policy on the German and European competitive position

The end of the Kohl era and the ushering in of a new governing coalition in Germany on the eve of the start of the single currency in Europe provides a vantage point from which to reflect on the evolution of the German and European competitive position over recent decades and the outlook for the next few.

Many will agree that throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s Helmut Kohl displayed statesmanlike qualities in successfully managing for Germany primarily, and for Europe in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, several major coincident and mutually influencing currents in economics and politics. The major currents included: the Western economic expansion in the 1980s; technological innovation, especially in the information technology and telecommunications sectors, leading to significant developments in national and international financial systems and global trade and investment; the end of the Cold War; German unification; European integration through the Maastricht process; the maintenance of the Welfare State in Europe.

Since last century and especially since the 1930s, Western countries have combined the industrial market economy and the Welfare State. Germany emerged from the post-WWII settlement as Europe’s industrial powerhouse and it challenged the United States for pre-eminence in several sectors and many markets as productivity improved at a greater pace and the D-mark appreciated in real terms. Meanwhile welfare spending, government budget deficits, and inflation began rising in the mid-to-late 1960s, though the Germans appeared to be more adept at managing their finances and economy than most of their European partners and the US. In any case, these were some of the major factors which led to the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system under the Bretton Woods agreements. Then, in retrospect, the post-WWII boom period can be said to have come to a definitive end in the wake of the two oil shocks in the 1970s, a decade marked by stagflation, decolonization, and the Soviets’ gaining the upper hand in the Cold War. A new economic and political formula on a global scale was needed as Western countries faced the prospect of getting their stagnating economies moving again, financing welfare-induced deficits and debts spread over aging populations, and regaining the geo-strategic momentum. The answer, led by the United States and Great Britain, was supply-side economics, privatization, financial deregulation, free trade, the wide-spread application of new information systems and telecommunications technologies to finance, industry and commerce on a global scale, preparation for new markets in East Asia, Latin America and, later, central Europe, and, finally, the arms build-up. All these factors played a major role in exposing the inefficiencies of the Soviet system, leading to its unexpectedly premature collapse.

Germany thrived economically, along with its Western partners and Japan, though its success was less due to the application of neo-classical policies than to its universal banking system, the harmonious relationship between business and labor, on the one hand, and the education system and the job market, on the other, a more long-term approach emphasizing asset accumulation and market share, and careful monetary management. The high quality of German products overcame the high cost of labor and the inefficiencies of the country’s welfare and financial systems, certainly, at least, to a greater extent than was the case with Germany’s main European partners/competitors such as France and Italy. Indeed, the quest for greater financial, labor, and goods market efficiency to stimulate the European economies and better finance their Welfare States was one of the major driving factors on the path towards European integration in addition to the need for a more compact security arrangement. And indeed, again, in the geo-political sphere, Germany’s support was crucial to the peaceful and favorable outcome of the Cold War, and Chancellor Kohl’s efforts bore fruit as the two Germanys were united and the Maastricht Treaty was signed.

However, by 1992, the post-Cold War world of emerging markets, global capitalism, and the high costs of German unification exposed some of the weaknesses of the European competitive position. The Bundesbank maintained a tight monetary policy despite slow growth and/or recession, in order to stave off inflation and help pay for the costs of integrating the eastern Länder. The most vulnerable countries were those featuring high welfare-induced budget deficits and unsustainable debt, bloated bureaucracies, overly burdensome tax systems stifling innovative investment, rigid labor markets dominated by powerful unions with a significant influence on fiscal policy, and inefficient financial systems. The first victim was Italy which, along with Great Britain, was forced to leave the EMS in September 1992. In the summer of 1993, the EMS nearly collapsed under the pressure of high German interest rates. And in 1994 and early 1995, the Mexican crisis, the persistent budget problems in Canada, and the trade deficit in the US cast doubt over the stability of the North American financial system. In late winter/early spring 1995, the US dollar, Italian lira and Swedish crown, among others, reached all-time lows against the D-mark. The Bundesbank’s severe monetary policy management inspired investors’ confidence when they compared the alternatives and short-term capital seeking a safe haven, as well as reserves, poured into the D-mark (and into the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen). However, between March and August 1995, a series of coordinated policy measures and, from September, somewhat more responsible fiscal policies on the part of the several nation-States, helped to stabilize the international currency markets, halt, and later reverse, the rise of the D-mark, and get the European countries back on the integration track as envisioned by the Maastricht Treaty.

However, during this period, the D-mark’s brilliant performance on European and international currency markets obscured certain ongoing developments acting against the competitive position of Germany in particular and Europe as a whole. First, notwithstanding the Mexican crisis and the trade deficit, a new political balance in Washington set the United States down the path to serious welfare and budget reform. This was accompanied by a long period of economic expansion featuring a high level of investment in innovative technologies yielding good returns, high levels and high proportions of foreign direct investment into the United States and US FDI abroad, low unemployment and inflation rates, and now even a small budget surplus. Meanwhile, the newly industrialized countries and emerging markets of East Asia were experiencing almost double-digit annual growth rates. And though the current crisis has revealed that much of the investment there, funneled through shoddy banking systems, was overly speculative, real gains have been made and the basis for another round of dynamic growth, though probably at a lesser pace than in the boom years of the 1990s, is still intact. Analogous observations could be made concerning South America, though to a somewhat lesser extent.

These developments stand in contrast to the manner in which the integration process in Europe has been completed. For example, it is true that the 3% government budget deficit target has, by and large, been met, but this has been achieved with the benefit of accounting tricks in almost all the countries participating in the euro, though flagrant cases stand out, such as Italy. Meanwhile real welfare and labor market reforms, where at all, have been timid. For Germany, and other European countries, this has translated into high unemployment rates and slow export-led growth; the bulk of productive investment is directed to high-technology and export-oriented industries, reducing the need for unskilled industrial labor. And in those industries where a relatively high proportion of unskilled labor is still required, there have been sizable outflows of foreign direct investment from the West, led by Germany, to central Europe, and to East Asia and South American as well. The greatest benefit, then, of monetary integration to Germany and to Europe is a more efficient, continent-wide financial system, a financial system now integrated into the global economy; large-company exports and investment in emerging markets abroad will generate the bulk of the earnings growth necessary to finance the continuation of the Welfare State as European populations age.

Against this backdrop, the Asian crisis has had an ambiguous effect on the German and European economy. On the one hand, the cessation of high growth rates in East Asia and the exploitation of the soft spots of its financial systems mean that Europe must face a weakened, though still potentially formidable, competitor on the global market. The immediate benefits were seen in the run-up to the single currency as capital flowing into all European currencies totally eliminated any latent risks of last minute speculation against its realization. In the short/medium-term, it also means less pressure to reform Europe’s welfare systems and labor markets. On the other hand, the Asian crisis has meant a noticeable slowdown in Europe’s export-led growth. In addition, the Russian crisis has been a significant blow to Germany whose banking and industrial systems are more exposed than those of any other country. The overall effect has been the emergence of a risk of world-wide recession in 1999.

In this situation, the main priority in the economic program of the new Schroeder government is to provide a boost to consumer purchasing power as part of a Keynesian-style demand stimulus policy. Other countries such as Italy have attempted, or are attempting, a similar approach. In Germany, the impact of the proposals on the redistribution of income in favor of low/medium-income groups, with a high propensity to consume, is rather significant, as personal income taxes will be reduced and welfare payments to families will be increased. Business tax rates will also be reduced, but the tax base will be widened as the scope of allowable deductions and exemptions will be diminished. Nonetheless, according to the Schroeder government’s projections, both businesses and workers are expected to benefit from the tax rate reductions; the burden of welfare taxes in Germany is equally distributed between companies and employees. Meanwhile, the government proposes to finance the reduction in welfare taxes through a rise in taxation on energy products. Some studies simulating the effects of a 3% reduction in welfare taxes in Germany financed by an increase in indirect taxes suggest a 1% rise in consumer spending, boosting employment by 0.8% and GDP growth by 0.6%.

In addition, the new government will eliminate the modest labor market and pension system reforms introduced in the latter years of the Kohl government (reduction in sick pay, pension cuts, greater employment flexibility for small businesses, etc.). This intention confirms that supply-side policies do not seem to play a fundamental role in the new government’s framework. Such a step, in addition to the new tax measures, has strongly upset business which now appears rather skeptical about the main pillar of the new government’s jobs promotion policy, namely the Alliance for Jobs. The prospects for the tripartite negotiations between government, business, and labor for the moment seem obscure and the evident perception by the business community of a new government hostile to its demands is not a good starting point.

In conclusion, Europe is still one of the wealthiest and highest income-producing-potential regions in the world, and Germany is the leading economy in Europe. The real issue is what level of average growth Europe will be able to achieve over the coming years and decades, how it will be achieved, how it will be distributed, and how it will continue to finance the maintenance of the Welfare State. One answer has been export-led growth and income generated from foreign direct investment, especially, in the case of Germany, in low-labor-cost central European countries and Russia, in the context of the global economic system. Other European countries with somewhat different trade and investment patterns, such as Spain, Portugal, Great Britain and Sweden, may provide for some diversification (though the latter two are not, as of yet, participating in the single currency).

But there are risks to this strategy. The global economy and financial system are still prone to crises and income flows are far from being smoothed out. Furthermore, Germany, the largest European economy, has the greatest exposure to central Europe and Russia. The former may prove to be a slow-growth area, caught in the middle, as it is, between already slow-growth Europe and Russia itself where efforts to transform the country into a functioning and prosperous free market democracy may fail.

Internally, reform of Europe’s indebted welfare systems and rigid labor markets has been very gradual where any real progress has been made at all. Current governments, led by Schroeder’s Germany, are implementing policies designed to stimulate consumer demand through income redistribution in an effort to stave off a potential recession (in addition to other domestic political considerations). This strategy may work as a short-term expedient, but the risk is that Europe will remain a slow-growth region of the world, its rate of investment and productivity growth will lag behind that of the United States and possibly a revived Japan and East Asia in a few years, the population will continue to age, small and medium-sized business enterprises will be crowded out, and the investments in central Europe and Russia will not provide an adequate return. Such a scenario would mean a stagnant Europe, economically, politically, socially and culturally, and a people dependent on the fortunes and whims of big government and big business in the face of a fiercely competitive global environment.

Reform the International Monetary System or Reform the Nation-State System?

_{This is the second in a series of two essays written} in 1995 (see below "The Finances of the Nation-State and the Global Foreign Exchange System" and the introduction for greater context). In the event, the solution to some of the problems outlined in this essay has been the use of ITC technology, coupled with international capital market and trade liberalization, to advance globalization (see "Musings On The Global Economy"). In effect, in the past ten years or so, the international monetary system has been reformed a lot less and with much less volatility than the nation-state system has been reformed, a process that is still ongoing.

_{Reform the International Monetary System or Reform the Nation-State System? (June 14, 1995)}

_{In spite of the foreign exchange regime change from fixed to floating rates since 1973, macroeconomic imbalance has persisted in many countries, and in the context of many discussions in the literature it is expressed most specifically as an external adjustment problem (current account deficit/surplus) but it is intimately related to internal fiscal imbalance. This lack of achievement of external and internal balance under the floating exchange rate regime, as many had in principle expected, coupled with the costs of trade perceived to be associated with foreign exchange rate volatility and exchange rate misalignment, has given rise to proposals of reform of the so-called international monetary system. In this essay we shall discuss and evaluate proposals for reform involving increased international economic policy coordination and other alternatives as well as the problems and feasibility of these proposals in a global setting.}

_{As we consider the merits and demerits of the floating rate regime and proposals for reform, it becomes evident that a crucial aspect in determining our conclusions is the point of view that is highlighted concerning the root cause of foreign exchange rate volatility and the concept that we hold of national autonomy with respect to fiscal policy.}

_{As John Williamson explains, the real exchange rate is linked to the real economy in that it is the main determinant of 'the division of domestic output between home and foreign markets and the distribution of domestic demand between home and foreign sources' of supply. Therefore the costs of exchange rate misalignment, as measured by a deviation from a fundamental equilibrium exchange rate, can be damaging to the real economy especially for those countries which have a relatively high proportion of economic output linked to international trade and financial flows. Williamson points out that 'a real exchange rate significantly out of line with that needed to sustain medium-run macro-equilibrium presents false signals to business that can misdirect investment or induce inappropriate closure of productive activity.' It is for these underlying reasons that economic policy makers around the globe are concerned with the level of foreign exchange rates and the intensity of exchange rate volatility. When considering proposals for reform, therefore, it is important to identify the fundamental causes of exchange rate misalignment and volatility. For as Feldstein points out, if we misidentify the causes of misalignment and volatility, a policy-directed target for foreign exchange rates may only exacerbate certain external and internal macroeconomic disequilibria and increase pressures which may lead to further volatility and misalignment. On the other hand, Williamson and, for example, proponents of the ERM sustain that a policy-directed target zone will provide a framework in which economic policy can be aimed at achieving external and internal adjustment towards equilibrium as measured by certain economic criteria.}

_{In light of these considerations, if it is believed that the adoption of the floating exchange rate regime has encouraged nation-states to pursue economic policies which have led to chronic imbalances, specifically fiscal imbalances and trade imbalances, and if it is believed that speculation is the main cause of exchange rate volatility and misalignment which decouple prices from fundamentals, then the question of how and to what extent to reform the international monetary system becomes of central importance. If, however it is believed that price distortion and speculation are the result of imbalanced economic policy of which foreign exchange rate misalignment and volatility are symptoms, then the pursuit of a more balance-oriented economic policy at the national level, with or without conscious international policy coordination, would naturally lead to more moderate and stable fluctuations in foreign exchange rates. Therefore, if the political leadership of the several nation-states continues to be incapable of pursuing more balance-oriented economic policies, then the question of how and to what extent to reform the nation-state system becomes more relevant than the question of reforming the international monetary system.}

_{The former point of view supports an affirmative evaluation of the case for international policy coordination as a means of reform, while the latter point of view suggests caution and skepticism but by no means rejects totally the case. Let us now take a closer look at the feasibility of and problems with the case for international coordination and other alternatives as proposals for reform in the global setting.}

_{When we speak of policy coordination in a strict sense as a matter recent historical practice, we refer to international forums such as the G-5, the G-7, or the IMF. The G-7 is essentially a semi-annual forum for the finance (or treasury) ministers of the major industrialized countries accompanied by the heads of government on an annual basis. The finance ministers' main influence is on national monetary policy in conjunction with the national central bankers. Their policy decisions and also public pronouncements can have significant effects on exchange rate movements. There have been examples of policy coordination which have moved the value of the USD to more desirable levels as the history has shown. The main policy instruments of the ministers and the central bankers are interest rates and foreign exchange market intervention. The developments of the 1980s led to a set of objective macroeconomic indicators - monitored by the IMF - including budget deficits, current account balances, and inflation which could trigger coordinated policy action in terms of interest rates and exchange market intervention aimed at correcting some of the national account imbalances. The tendency toward policy coordination in this context has receded in the 1990s as fiscal and current account imbalances have persisted and monetary policy makers have concentrated more of their attention on the domestic environment. As Frankel pointed out, the question of whether monetary policy improves or worsens the current account had not been resolved.}

_{In a broader sense, Williamson offered a blueprint for international economic policy coordination based on the idea of target zones. His plan includes targets for real exchange rates, interest rates, national fiscal policies, and debt to GDP ratios. This blueprint is more complete than the G-7 coordination framework because it explicitly considers national fiscal policy and provides for its internationally managed coordination to achieve a targeted path for the growth of domestic demand.}

_{The problems with these two frameworks for international policy coordination arise when the interconnections between monetary policy, national fiscal policy, national account imbalances and exchange rate fluctuations are considered. Let us accept the view that exchange rate volatility is caused by monetary and fiscal policies which lead to imbalances between saving and investment and between revenue and expenditure which become expressed as current account imbalances, government budget deficits, and accumulated debt. It is important to note that in constitutional democracies (which in the form of nation-state there are about 70 bodies politic recognized as such including the major trading nations) monetary and foreign exchange policy are made by the executive branch in some form of collaboration between the finance ministry and the central bank. The ultimate and legal responsibility for fiscal policy lies with the national legislative bodies (congresses and parliaments). Now, in this general framework we have three policy tools; monetary policy, fiscal policy, and exchange rate policy of which two can be controlled - in the floating exchange rate regime this means monetary and fiscal policy - and two targets; internal and external balance. Therefore in order to achieve balance and maintain exchange rate stability discipline must be exercised, in some combination, through monetary and fiscal policy. In the G-7 framework for international economic policy coordination, finance ministers, by virtue of the constitutional arrangements, focus on coordinating monetary policy as a discipline towards two-target balance across nation-states. In this context, and since balance requires discipline in both monetary and fiscal policy, a more relevant issue of the G-7 experience becomes the apparent failure, with the possible exception of Germany (where the central bank enjoys the utmost of independence and a single mission enshrined by statute) of monetary policy to discipline fiscal policy. Therefore it is correct to ask the question 'are finance ministers and central bankers the right groups on whose shoulders total responsibility for internal and external balance should lie?'. The Williamson blueprint rightfully takes into account that national fiscal policy and debt management are crucial aspects of discipline, balance, and stability, but it also underlines the realistic possibility (slim) of successful coordination of balanced fiscal policies across national legislative bodies.}

_{In a fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate regime, the two policy tools which can be controlled are indeed foreign exchange policy and fiscal policy while monetary policy becomes subordinate to maintaining the chosen exchange rate parities. In this regime, it is the fixity of the exchange rate which is supposed to act as the anchor of discipline on fiscal policy in order to maintain balance and stability. We can point to two historical experiences of fixed or semi-fixed regimes, the Bretton Woods system, and the European ERM, both of which exploded under pressures from imbalances.}

_{Problems and objections connected with the notion of internationally coordinated fiscal policy are often expressed as undue limits imposed on the independence of national economic policies and as a sacrifice of national autonomy and preferences in order to make the 'world features' of coordination proposals to work. Some argue that a certain loss of national independence is attributable to deregulated financial markets and the high degree of global short-term capital mobility, and furthermore that this is the cause of exchange rate volatility and impedes national governments from managing their economies. This line of argument has led to alternative proposals to international policy coordination aimed at " ... greater financial segmentation between nations ..." and "permitting their central banks and governments greater autonomy." These include Tobin's proposal of a small tax on foreign exchange operations which would be small enough to not affect commercial trade and long-term capital investments, but steep enough to render short-term trading less profitable, and that of dual exchange rates - a fixed rate for commercial transactions, and a floating rate for capital transactions. Both these proposals take the point of view that short-term volatility is caused by speculation which may have perverse effects on the real economy. There are several problems with these proposals. First, taxes and dual rates may only cause further distortion. It is difficult to always separate current account from capital account transactions, and to know how much of short-term capital movement has a stabilizing effect on financing current account deficits. Secondly, a tax regime would not only entail bureaucratic administrative costs, it would be feasibly difficult to enforce around the globe as enough foreign exchange centers would not adhere to the regime so that those centers which did would lose massive amounts of business. Finally, even if this perceived greater national government autonomy were achieved, why should it be expected that governments would behave any differently than they have in the past?}

_{If we consider again the view that price distortion and speculation are the result of imbalanced economic policy of which foreign exchange rate volatility is a symptom, then it is neither necessary nor helpful to interpret policy coordination as a sacrifice of autonomy imposed top-down through an international or supranational institutional pyramid. Through self-discipline we enhance autonomy and independence. Ideally, fiscal discipline should begin locally and from there be extended to the national legislative bodies, and then to the international, or better still, directly to the global level. If top-side institutions and systems can encourage and foster local discipline, so much the better. But it a waste of time and an empty wish to expect finance ministers, central bankers, and IMF technicians to tinker with institutional arrangements and systems in the hope that stability and equilibrium will follow automatically. We should not expect external and internal adjustment to come as a result of our choice of exchange rate regime. It is the ensemble of local realities which imply the world feature - as a result of several cases of self-discipline and sacrifice. Our views of sacrifice, then, depend on which end of the pyramid we choose to emphasize.}

_{The real conclusion is that we have twice depended upon fiscal policy as the main determinant of (dis-) equilibrium. It does not really matter what type of exchange rate regime is in place. Imbalanced fiscal policies will cause disequilibria, and these disequilibria will be manifest in one way or another sooner or later ... whether through the foreign exchange system, the financial system, the economic system, the political system, or the social system, or any combination of the above interconnected realities.}

_{Tinkering with the international monetary system or reforming it substantially may indeed have some effect on the management of foreign exchange rate volatility. But at the end of the day it is fiscal imbalance which is the root cause of chronic macroeconomic disequilibria. The daily shenanigans of the foreign exchange market are symptoms, not causes, of these disequilibria. In fact the global foreign exchange system has worked well in absorbing the recurrent shocks caused by this (nation-) state of affairs.}

_{On the eve of the most recent G-7 summit in these last days, John Chretien, PM of Canada, on the problem of currency market volatility, urged G-7 countries to stabilize markets by following sound monetary and fiscal policies.}

_{"Attempting to return to fixed or targeted exchange rates is no longer a realistic option in deregulated financial markets, and Canada's experience with floating exchange rates showed that they served a useful function by providing time for governments to make necessary economic adjustments."}

_SOURCES

_{Feldstein, M., "The Case against Trying to Stabilize the Dollar", American Economic Review, 79, No. 2, May, 1989.}

_{Frankel, J., "Obstacles to International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination", IMF Working Paper No. WP/87/29, April, 1987.}

_{Tobin, J., "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform", Eastern Economic Journal, 4, pp. 153-159, 1987.}

_{Williamson, J., The Case for Roughly Stabilizing the Real Value of the Dollar, American Economic Review, 79, No. 2, May, 1989.}

The Finances of the Nation-State and the Global Foreign Exchange System

This essay was written on April 24, 1995, in the wake of the collapse of the European Monetary System in 1992 and the North American currency crisis of 1994/1995, during a period featuring high budget deficits among most of the early industrialized countries. In the ensuing years, fiscal balance was restored in the United States and improved in Europe in the run-up to the introduction of the single currency. Since then, however, nation-state finances have once again begun to erode in the face of war in the case of the United States and continued relative economic stagnation in Europe. A new element in the equation today is the impact of China and, eventually, the role of the Chinese yuan, both present and going forward.

What we are witnessing is the erosion of the financial solvency of the nation-state. This erosion is most clearly expressed by the current developments in the foreign exchange market. On the one hand it has hit North America, beginning with Canada about a year and a half ago, and most recently with the United States in the wake of the financial disaster in Mexico at the end of 1994. On the other hand the erosion has hit Europe, beginning in Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom in 1992, followed by the debacle of the European Monetary System in August 1993, and until today as the meteoric rise of the DEM, CHF, and JPY has again exposed the financial weakness of nation-states like Italy, Spain, and Sweden, and the continuing decline of Great Britain as an industrial, political, and financial power on the global scale.

A currency is the standard bearer of a national financial system, the financial system of a nation-state and all the activities which fall under its legally recognized jurisdiction and its international linkages. And what we see now is the damage that uncontrolled debt can do. The cause of debt is the moral profligacy and lack of civil and human responsibility of the bands of men in power who occupy the institutions of legally recognized systems of social control. The consequences of debt, the consequences of the erosion of the financial solvency of the nation-state may be terrible, but not necessarily so. Some good may come of it. The current phase of this process may come to an end within a few months. But the long-term trend will continue, at different paces in different countries, and there will be more intense periods like the one we are living now. We should like to examine some aspects of the process as they apply to certain nation-states, examine some of the common problems which give the process an international character, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the several nation-states as the process affects them, as it spirals down its unpredictable path. For now I shall limit myself to a summary of the fundamentals of the global foreign exchange system as it currently stands.

We can conceive of the global foreign exchange system as consisting of several overlapping layers the most broad of which is the very globality of the system itself. The sub-layers consist of what some consider regional blocs which reflect geographical proximities, commercial patterns, and cultural and historical ties. These blocs are mostly distinguished as the Yen bloc, the D-Mark bloc, and the dollar bloc, without forgetting the global interconnections. I conceive of the system as an ensemble of rhythms and pressures. The most broad rhythm runs across geography over time ... Tokyo, London, New York ... Tokyo, London, New York ... Tokyo, London, New York. You know they "pass the book". It never ends. Right now, wrestling at the pinnacle of the system is the Japanese Yen. It is the strongest currency on the planet owing to the hard work of the Japanese people, their propensity to save, their brilliant success in global commerce, and the tenacity with which they strive to protect and enhance their position. They have achieved these things together as a nation-state and the national accounts are in order. (Though some make a strong argument that the huge perennial trade surplus is a gross and distorted imbalance.) On top of that, they are located in the geographical region of the Earth that is presently enjoying the highest rate of economic growth as measured in national income accounting terms. So, for at least these reasons, the Japanese Yen is acting as the pivot in the global foreign exchange system. On the days when the Yen exerts pressure, the effects reverberate throughout the system. The most important currency relationships then, globally speaking, are USD/JPY and DEM/JPY. Of these two, which is the more important protagonist depends on the day and the dynamic within the D-Mark bloc or the dollar bloc during a particular phase of movement of global and regional rhythms and pressure points. What is fair to say is, that for the better part now, the USD/DEM relationship is more a function of USD/JPY and DEM/JPY than a direct function of itself. That is not to say that the direct USD/DEM relationship has no importance. It means that the influence of USD/JPY and DEM/JPY on USD/DEM has greater weight than it ever has had in the past. The coefficients are changing. This reflects changes in the foreign exchange composition of stocks of reserves, and it will affect how savings from new flows of global income will be held in reserve.

At the pinnacle of the European sub-system is the D-Mark. The reasons for this are similar to those for which the Yen is at the pinnacle globally. The Germans have achieved success cohesively as a nation-state. They have even managed to absorb their eastern half in a stable manner, so far it seems, in the face of enormous financial pressures. This impressive display of stability, on a complex and often chaotic continent, stands on the discipline employed by the men of the BUBA in pursuing a monetary policy successfully aimed at controlling inflation even under the pressures of the external shock of reunification. It also stands on the coolness with which their political leaders predictably and steadily handled the whole affair. Underneath this, the German social system entails huge costs, and the price of labor is high. It remains to be seen whether German industry can continue to adapt to the high D-Mark by cutting costs and improving productivity, quality, and technology, in the face of competition from American and some other countries' firms who are reputed to be more flexible and innovative in a fast-changing world. But this medium-term risk pales into insignificance when compared to the immediate financial risk confronted by savers and investors based in other currencies in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The financial systems of nation-states on the perimeters of Europe are either de facto insolvent (though not officially recognized as such for political reasons) or they are marching steadfastly down the path to insolvency. It is mainly for this reason that the D-Mark (and the Swiss Franc, the currency of a nation-state which is another island of stability and credibility whose national accounts are in order) enjoys safe-haven status whenever, and it happens often nowadays, the pressures of the burdens of these debts cause the European Monetary System to go again into extremis. The only thing that prevents the European sub-system from going into a coma is the operation of some of the safety valves working to relieve tensions in the global system of rhythms and pressure points on a phase to phase basis which reaches peaks and troughs based on technical, economic, and political cycles. We would intend to examine this in detail, but first let us take a look at the dollar bloc.

The dollar bloc includes not only of course the USD and the CAD, NZD, AUD, but also the GBP (especially considering the UK's political posture towards the EU), many Latin American currencies, and those Pacific Rim currencies somehow pegged to the dollar. The USD's long-term relative decline in global terms accelerated in 1985 and intensified in 1992 and has intensified more acutely in these last four to six months. The principal fundamental reason for this is that the USA was formerly the world's largest creditor nation and is now the world's largest debtor nation in absolute terms. The country's savings to investment gap is expressed by its twin budget and current account deficits. The global foreign exchange system is awash in USD debt. And the stock of debt is increased annually by a combined USD 500 billion+ or so. The USA's main trading partners are Canada and Mexico. These three nations have joined together commercially through NAFTA. This commercial link also implies however political and financial commitments and in this sense we can conceive of the North American financial system. This system has its own internal logic, a logic with respect to other currencies of the dollar bloc, and a logic with respect to the rest of the global foreign exchange system. Canada also sustains national account imbalances in the form of budget deficits, current account deficits, and a high national debt. In addition there is political risk connected with the constitutional and Quebec issues. In recent years, the risks in Canada have been perceived as quite high as against the USD and other major currencies around the world. The USD/CAD has declined from a period peak of around 1.12 in 1989 to as low as around 1.43 in the last weeks. The risks in Mexico have been known for decades, but hopes were high as the NAFTA process was successfully concluded. Mexico's close association with the United States was perceived as providing political guaranties for Mexican risk. When Mexico's most recent wave of macro-imbalances came crashing down in December 1994, it highlighted a new perception that the entire North American financial system is heading for insolvency. The collapse of the Mexican peso was the trigger event which set off the massive and volatile switching of global reserve assets from the USD and into the JPY, DEM, and CHF.

The above paragraphs have outlined the basic state of being of the global foreign exchange system with a view toward the financial systems of the major nation-states, of whose currencies it is comprised, in light of recent events. An analysis of the details, I believe, will show that it is not the foreign exchange system which is in crisis. In fact it has worked quite well globally, within the D-Mark bloc, and within the dollar bloc, as it was designed to do. Rather it is the financial systems of the nation-states themselves which are in crisis. The global foreign exchange system's ensemble of rhythms, pressures, and safety valves operating around technical, economic, and political cycles is indeed the mechanism which allows the nation-states periods of respite (lasting either days, weeks, months, or years depending on the rhythms and cycles) in order to address the fundamental problems of their financial systems. It is this ensemble mechanism which, so far, has prevented a "meltdown" or a drain of cash flow from the weaker financial systems which is so sudden, massive, and decisive that it would cause unavoidable and, above all, unhideable de jure sovereign default. I also believe that an analysis of the details will show that the primary cause of the weakness of the financial systems of certain nation-states is hardly monetary policy, but clearly fiscal policy. And it is these fiscal imbalances which have shaken the financial systems of the nation-states and damaged the credibility of the concept and the institutions of the nation-state in the minds of individuals.

Riflessioni sull'economia globale

Caro Maurizio,

ricordo che un paio d'anni fa or sono, nel 2003, parlavamo sull'economia e che, in particolare, di aver detto che, dopo il boom tecnologico ITC degli anni '90, non c'è più dove investire nel senso reale del termine (e non nel senso speculativo).

Ovviamente tale dichiarazione richiede una spiegazione dei dettagli fattuali che le sta dietro.

Condizioni politiche permettendo, comunicazioni instantanei mondiali significano che i grandi gruppi di potere - governi nazionali e imprese multinazionali, soprattutto - possono organizzare una divisione di lavoro proprio mondiale. Sotto queste condizioni, possono optimizzare l'allocazione delle risorse nei diversi settori: per esempio, da una parte, la produzione industriale di manufatti in aree dove la manodopera costa meno (ora Asia - Cina e India in testa - rispetto ai centri di vecchia industrializzazione quale Europa, America anglofona e Giappone) e, dall'altra parte, nello sviluppo, disegno e pianificazione dell'applicazione delle tecnologie che le stanno dietro in aree dove l'istruzione universitaria e la conoscenza sono ad un più alto livello di qualità, cioè ancora, per ora, negli stessi vecchi centri di industrializzazione.

Intanto, questi stessi vecchi centri di industrializzazione - proprio vecchi anche nel senso demografico - importano persone di bassa istruzione per lavorare nel settore dei servizi di basso livello e della costruzione. In particolare, gli Stati Uniti importano non solo merci di basso costo dalla Cina, ma anche persone a basso costo da Messico ed il resto dell'America Latina. Pure l'Europa, sebbene a misura minore e con riluttanza, importa tali persone dall'Africa, dall'Asia occidentale, dall'Europa centrale, ed in alcuni casi (la Spagna e l'Italia) anche dall'America Latina, tutte aree dove la demografia è "giovane", però manca un'industrializzazione forte, come ora nell'India e nell'Asia orientale.

Fin'ora tutto molto bene: l'investimento nella tecnologia ITC significa merci e servizi ad un costo più basso e quindi, nell'aggregato più alta produttività per tutti e una più alta qualità di vita per tutti su una scala relativa mondiale, almeno in principio, inclusi anche, e forse in particolare, i lavoratori "intellettuali" nei paesi di vecchia industrializzazione. Forse gli unici veri perdenti in questo scenario sono i lavoratori di bassa istruzione impiegati nella produzione di manufatti basata negli stessi vecchi centri di industrializzazione, ma ci sono anche programmi di riqualificazione e comunque molti di questi sono vicini al pensionamento.

Però, in questo scenario ci sono diversi problemi di natura economica, politica, e di struttura sociale, problemi che si riflettono anche sullo scenario finanziario. Di seguito, riassumo solo alcuni aspetti dei problemi più importanti su questi quattro piani.

Sul piano economico, mi concentro sull'offerta ed il costo dell energia, settore che riafferma la sua centralità negli affari umani dal momento che, da una parte, c'è bisogno di alimentare il crescente numero di fabbriche in paesi quale la Cina e, dall'altra, c'è bisogno di trasportare tutta questa mercanzia ai centri di consumo oltre mari e monti. Poi si può aggiungere il bisogno di riscaldare le case dei vecchi pensionati nei paesi di vecchia industralizzazione (pensionati non tanto vecchi in alcuni paesi, in particolare nell'Europa occidentale, Italia in testa) e alimentare il loro SUV, ecc.

Già allora sorge un problema politico: le fonti tuttora più efficienti dell'energia (petroleo e gas naturale) si trovano per la maggior parte dentro o all'intorno di paesi dove importanti gruppi aspiranti di potere, con altra ideologia - che certi gruppi di potere già stabiliti marchiano come "terroristi" - vogliono, appunto, aumentare e officializzare il proprio potere, e quindi per raggiungere questo scopo fanno guerra, la cui posta in gioco ed il prezzo dell'energia, a chi venderla, e come ridistribuire il reditto così generato.

Ovviamente mi riferisco ai paesi arabi, e a quelli che si estendono dall'Africa nordorientale fino all'Asia centrale e persino Indonesia, ed agli Islamisti. C'è qualcosa di simile in atto anche nell'America Latina, anche se non al livello di una guerra calda e con ideologie più miti, in particolare in Venezuela (il quinto produttore mondiale di petrolio) ed ora in Bolivia (recentemente scoperte enormi quantità di gas naturale) di cui più in seguito. Lotte in Paesi africani come Nigeria ed Angola possono altrettanto essere viste in questo contesto.

Rivolgendomi ora al problema della struttura sociale, vorrei sottolineare un fenomeno generale e uno particolare che ci riguarda anche personalmente. Il punto generale è che storicamente, parlando di grandi gruppi di potere, qualsiasi cambiamento nelle relazioni territoriali per motivi di cambiamenti tecnologici e/o economici e/o sociopolitici, comporta anche la sfida di come gestire i potenziali e reali cambiamenti sociali all'interno del territorio dei rispettivi grandi gruppi di potere che ne risultano.

In quanto al fenomeno particolare, ricordo, come accennato sopra, l'investimento nella tecnologia ITC significa merci e servizi ad un costo più basso e quindi, nell'aggregato più alta produttività per tutti e una più alta qualità di vita per tutti su una scala relativa mondiale, almeno in principio, inclusi anche, e forse in particolare, i lavoratori "intellettuali" nei paesi di vecchia industrializzazione.

Però in realtà non è tanto semplice, nè è tanto semplice capire la realtà e forse ancora meno descriverla in un'economia di parole. Comunque ci provo, come l'Iddio comanda.

Ovviamente le società di prima (vecchia) industrializzazione non possono portare avanti i modelli sociali sviluppati verso la fine del dicianovesimo secolo e durante il ventesimo secolo, soprattutto quello del dopo seconda guerra mondiale fino alla fine della guerra fredda. Allo stesso tempo, i gruppi di poteri stabiliti - nè nei paesi di prima industralizzazione, nè nei paesi emergenti, nè nei paesi cosìdetti sottosviluppati (mi riferesisco in particolare all'America Latina), nè nei paesi "tradizionali" (mi riferisco soprattutto ai paesi arabi) - non vogliono perdere controllo durante questa fase di trasformazione dell'economia globale.

Un metodo di controllo provato per tutta la storia da duemilacinquecento anni - e qui mi rivolgo allo scenario finanziario - è l'indebitamento sociofinanziario, assieme al suo socio, l'inflazione: cioè, in altre parole, il controllo dell'offerta di moneta, del mezzo di scambio, dell'unità di conto e della riserva di valore materiale. (C'è anche il metodo militare, tutt'ora impiegato, tra ancora altri metodi di controllo.)

In principio, merci e servizi ad un costo più basso e più alta produttività al livello aggregato dovrebbero significare un livello di prezzi stabile o anche una leggera deflazione. In tale scenario, ci potrebb'essere per tutti una vera più alta qualità di vita su una scala relativa mondiale, inclusi anche, e forse in particolare, i lavoratori "intellettuali" nei paesi di vecchia industrializzazione. Immaginati che cambiamenti sociopolitico-culturali ci potrebbero essere attraverso una vera liberazione di intelletto creativo, temperata da una sensibilità di mantenere quello che ha conservato vero valore morale e culturale attraverso i secoli.

Però la volontà degli attuali grandi gruppi di potere è che non ci siano cambiamenti fondamentali negli assi portanti degli attuali modelli sociopolitici, basati sull'ideologia culturale del materialismo consumistico - della variante capitalista, socialista, o comunista (cosìdette) che sia -, attraverso la mera estensione mondiale del modello economico dell'industrializzazione organizzazata da una combinazione di mercati liberi e intervenzione statale. L'unica alternativa offerta dall'attuale agenda politica mondiale sarebbe l'Islamismo radicale, che nella mia opinione significherebbe, in poche parole, il rovescio dei guadagni della rivoluzione industriale di questi ultimi duecento anni.

Invece, assumendo che i gruppi di potere stabiliti vincano la guerra contro l'Islamismo radicale, la struttura sociale continuerà a trasformarsi verso una struttura che combini i guadagni della rivoluzione industriale di questi ultimi duecento anni su una scala mondiale sul campo economico - analogamente si sono diffusi i guadagni della rivoluzione agricola da diecimila anni fa - con un crescente divario tra gruppi di ricchezza/reditto (pochi iperricchi e molti relativamente poveri) ed una classe media (inclusi i lavoratori intellettuali) sempre più piccola, proprio somigliante ad una struttura sociale agricola "tradizionale".

E gli strumenti chiavi nell'attuare tale trasformazione sono il controllo dell'offerta dell'energia (ad altre materie prime) e poi il controllo dell'offerta di moneta, l'indebitamento, e l'inflazione (e quindi anche controllo della manipolazione dei dati sull'inflazione resi pubblici, che implica anche il grande campo del controllo del mass media).

Così, le classi lavoratrici, intellettuali e non, saranno fissi e/o flessibili nei loro posti, fisici nonchè socioeconomici, a volontà dei dirigenti dei grandi gruppi di potere (rule by telecommand), sotto il dominio di un'ideologia materialista consumistica, al livello mondiale.

I dettagli, tra altri, di tale attuazione sono, nei paesi di prima industrializzazione, negli alti costi dei sistemi pensionistici, sanitari e universitari, nelle bolle speculative nei prezzi dei beni (asset price bubbles) - dieci anni fa nelle azioni, ora nel mercato immobiliare residenziale -, e nella diffusione attraverso il sistema bancario del credito al consumo e dell'indebitamento delle famiglie e la manipolazione soprattutto dei dati sull'inflazione, e, al livello mondiale, nei movimenti migratori, soprattutto verso i paesi di prima industrializzazione.

In poche parole, ci sarà, ad un certo punto, più equilibrio nella produzione di beni manufatti e servizi tra le diverse aree del mondo (ed anche, quindi, nella bilancia dei pagamenti): la presenza di fabbriche tornerà a crescere nell'Europa e negli Stati Uniti, ma i lavoratori non saranno necessariamente i discendenti degli pensionati attuali e di prossimo futuro, e i relativi costi sociali saranno di proporzioni minori rispetto a quelli dei modelli in vigore da diverse generazioni nei paesi di prima industrializzazione.

Riassemendo, dunque, il ricordo dell'apertura, vedo l'investimento e l'applicazione al livello e sulla scala mondiale della tecnologia ITC negli ultimi quindici o vent'anni e dalla fine della guerra fredda come una seconda onda della rivoluzione industriale, le cue implicazioni sociali, politiche e economiche sono ancora da determinare (vedi conflitti militari, speculazioni finanziarie, disequilibri nella bilancia dei pagamenti tra i vari paesi, indebitamento pubblico e privato, i tentativi di gestire cambiamenti climatici reali e immaginati, tra altri fenomeno che generano incertezze).

Però per il futuro prevedibile, forse i prossimi cinquanta-cent'anni, nella mia visione attuale almeno, avremo una struttura sociale che combina i guadagni dell'industrializzazione degli ultimi duecento anni con alcuni aspetti sociali che assomigliano a quella delle società agricole "tradizionali", basata, però, su una dominante ideologia materialista consumistica in mano ai grandi gruppi di potere attuali, lasciando la conservazione della cultura ed i valori morali agli sforzi di gruppi più piccole ed agli individui che hanno ancora il tempo, la volontà e la forza.

E questo spazio ci sarà: i grandi gruppi di potere attuali sono, appunto, grandi e potenti, però non sono totalitari (vedi il nazismo, il comunismo e l'Islamismo radicale), e una buona parte dei dirigenti di questi gruppi vedono anche loro un proprio beneficio nel lasciare libera una parte di questo campo della vita umana sulla terr

Ora di seguito alcune osservazioni, nel quadro dello scenario delineato, sulla situazione economicosociale nelle regioni ed in alcuni paesi dove mi sono goduto del privilegio - grazie anche all'investimento nella tecnologia ITC in questi ultimi quindici/vent'anni - di vivere, lavorare e studiare.

Come noto, nell'Europa c'è in atto da ormai diversi anni una lotta tra quelle forze sociali che vogliono conservare il più possibile il modello sociale di cui sopra, da una parte, e quelle che sono in una posizione di guadagnare dalla mondializzazione dell'economia, dall'altra (a volte forze sovraposte e contradittorie tra di loro, come spesso succede nella politica).

Il risultato finora in paesi come l'Italia, con sistemi sociali rigidi (compresi il sistema politico, la burocrazia ed il mercato di lavoro in particolare) è che la società sta consumando la ricchezza generata nel passato ad un tasso più rapido di quello al quale sta generando nuova ricchezza, ed i giovani trovano relativamente poco spazio per esprimere guadagnevolmente i propri talenti, e cioè in posti di lavoro che pagano bene e nella formazione di nuove imprese di successo (invece di essere soffocate dalla burocrazia prima di generare anche un euro di profitto), permettendogli di facilitare la formazione di nuove famiglie. Vedo che le imprese italiane che stanno prosperando sono proprio quelle che sono coinvolte nell'economia mondializzata, anche nei settori tradizionali dell'Italia moderna, come la moda e il settore tessile, ma altrettanto la costruzione di infrastutture in settore chiavi come energia e trasporto, tra alcuni altri.

Una possibile soluzione per l'Europa domestica rispetto ad una società più flessibile ed un aumento della produttività, mantendendo allo stesso tempo le medesime aspettative dello standard di vita, sarebbe un ritorno al protezionismo del passato, una fortress Europe, che dovrebbe, comunque, trovare una soluzione ai suoi bisogni energetici, forse integrandosi di più con la Russia, l'Asia centrale, e possibilmente anche con paesi come Iran, quotando il prezzo del petroleo in euro.

Per quanto riguarda gli Stati Uniti, sembra che ci sia un consensus politico quasi totale che la mondializzazione è l'unico sentiero avanti. Quindi l'aspetto che colpisce di più è il cambiamento della struttura sociale in atto. Mi sembra la chiave per evitare la servitù della gleba al livello di famiglia/individuale è quella di evitare l'indebitamento per un eccesso di consumo (con implicazioni anche morali).

La speculazione nel mercato immobiliare residenziale non è più sostenibile. Come risultato a lungo termine della sovraproduzione di case troppo grandi negli ultimi sette anni circa vedo la suddivisione di dette costruzione in case multifamiliari ed un cambiamento delle leggi sull'urbanistica (zoning laws), permettendo piccole attività industriali e commerciali in zone che finora sono strettamente residenziale - somigliante a quello che avevo visto nei villagi portoghesi solo sette o otti anni fa e quello che vedo come il modello dominante nell'America Latina - in parte per contrastare gli eccessivi costi di trasporto (commuting al posto di lavoro, in alcuni casi, oggi come oggi, fino a due ore solo andata) e di sostenere i costi (carry costs) di dette costruzioni in termini di debito ipotecario, spese di energia (luce, riscaldamento, condizionamento dell'aria), imposte locali sulla proprietà, assicurazioni, manutenzione fisica ed altri fattori, spese tutte che sono andate o stanno andando alle stelle negli Stati Uniti, per non parlare di spese sanitarie e di istruzione universitaria.

Una via di uscita per sia gli Stati Uniti che l'Europa, a parte una recrudescenza del protezionismo sia commerciale che immigratoria, sarebbe nuovo investimento in ed applicazione diffusa di una nuova(e) forma(e) di energia e di trasporto. Però nella struttura politica economica attuale nella quale domina il grande petroleo, non vedo tale cambiamento su un orizzonte visibile.

Per quanto riguarda l'America Latina invece, giudicando da quello che vedo finora in solo un paese, l'Ecuador, ho imparato quello che vuol dire un paese "sottosviluppato" (possiamo ormai scartare il termini "terzomondo" e per diversi motivi): c'è sviluppo industriale però ad un passo molto più lento, rispetto ai paesi di prima industrializzazione, nel mezzo di una classe dirigente con una mentalità "tradizionale agricola" che allo stesso tempo mantiene forti legami culturali e politici, nonchè economici e finanziari, con il "vecchio mondo" Europe e gli Stati Uniti.

Però, in contrasto, l'America Latina mantiene in un modo molto più diffuso alcuni aspetti della vecchia cultura "agricola tradizionale" che proprio valgono la pena di conservare, a mio modo di vedere, come la famiglia e l'arte di godersi la vita nonostante le condizioni materiali. Osservo questo riferendomi ad un concetto di ricchezza e povertà relative e con tutto rispetto per quelli che soffrono davvero una povertà assoluta. Ripeto, c'è sviluppo industriale nell'America Latina, anche se ad un ritmo molto lento, e soprattutto c'è mica una mancanza di cibo ed in molti ambienti il clima è favorevole alla dolce vita a gente che ci sa fare nel proprio modo; quello che manca, invece, in poche parole, sono istituzioni sociali (politiche ed economiche) che permetterebbero alla grande masse di persone di raggiungere un livello di vita materiale "goduto" da quelle dei paesi di prima industrializzazione.

Però, nella mia opinione, tale livello di vita materiale è sopravvalutato, non solo oggigiorno in termini di mercato, ma soprattutto in termini umani, e la gente nei paesi di prima industrializzazione continua a pagare un prezzo troppo alto in termini di rigidità sociale (la mancanza di libertà?) per conservare il sistema, anche dovuto a nozioni di propaganda nazionalista, snobbismo e addiritura puro razzismo: un poco di multilinguismo personale ed vera esperienza in situ vanno lontano nell'aiutare ad valorizzare i modi di vita altrui, allo stesso tempo augurandogli i frutti più dolci (e non quelli amari) dei sistemi dei paesi di prima industrializzazione, intanto che conservano le proprie tradizioni di vero valore.

In questo contesto, alcuni trend politici attuali in America Latina forse meritano un commento, anche se, a mio modo di vedere, il tema sottostante è quello di sempre: le classi dirigenti, di qualsiasi gusto in termini di propaganda politica, sono sinceri e hanno la capacità di trasformare il reditto generato da poche commodity in istituzioni sociali durevoli che siano in grado non solo di dare ad una quota sempre più alta delle rispettive popolazioni uno standard di vita materiale più alto, ma anche più opportunità di crescere, di esprimere i propri talenti, in un'economia più diversificata e competitiva nel contesto mondiale? O si tratta del solito populismo la cui forza economica si basa in un boom del prezzo di una singola commodity destinato a rientrare a secondo del trend internazionale, terminando con la defenestrazione del demagoga di turno? Oggi come oggi mi riferisco in particolare a Hugo Chavez di Venezuela ed ultimamente a Evo Morales di Bolivia.

Certamente più integrazione regionale renderebbe ciascuno di questi paesi più competitivo al livello mondiale, e forse Brasil è l'esempio guida in questo senso, essendo anche l'unico paese in grado di essere da solo una potenza economica mondiale, non solo per la sua dimensione territoriale ma anche per la qualità della sua industria e la sua capacità nella ricerca e sviluppo. Altri paesi stanno tentando di combinare l'integrazione regionale con apertura commericiale internazionale: mi referisco in particolare all'accordo di libero commercio tra i paesi dell'America centrale (più la Republica Dominicana) con gli Stati Uniti, il negoziato per un accordo analogo tra i paesi andini - Colombia, Ecuador e Perù - con gli Stati Uniti (le firme finali sono attesi quest'anno 2006), gli accordi di libero commercio con Chile ed il NAFTA di Messico, e poi, infine, ci sono accordi analoghi in fase di negoziato tra diversi paesi/regioni latinoamericani e l'Unione Europea.

Vale la pena menzionare che, almeno nell'Ecuador che vedo, fra quelli che prosperano di più sono quelli coinvolti in qualche maniera con l'economia mondiale, che sia attraverso emmigrazione e le rimesse che mandano nel paese d'origine, o attraverso il commercio.

Quindi, anche una combinazione di socialismo populista e mercato libero in regime di economia aperta sarebbe bene in principio. La questione rimane se le classi dirigenti latinoamericane siano in grado di dare alle rispettive società istituzioni sociali adeguate per lo scenario mondiale attuale e, perlomeno, frenare la corruzione che tanto punisce quella che è per la maggior parte buona gente.

Per quanto riguarda i paesi dell'Asia orientale ed India, ovviamente non posso fare osservazioni personali, limitandomi invece ad alcune di carattere generale. Prima, mi sembra che il divario nel livello della vita materiale tra un lavoratore asiatico ed un lavoratore di un paese di prima industrializzazione sia destinato a restringersi con il tempo. Intanto, questi paesi si stanno migliorando sia in termini militari che in termini di tecnologia propria (miglioramento riflettuto anche nello sfero della ricerca universitaria autonoma).

Tale sviluppo rafforza l'idea e la realtà che i sistemi dei paesi di prima industrializzazione siano ormai o comunque saranno, sovravvalutati e dovranno mantenere la propria egemonia attraverso una combinazione di propaganda, ulteriore sviluppo tecnologico e di tecnici gestionale, e forse soprattutto un riinvigorire sociale. Altrimenti il loro destino potrebb'essere quello di diventare giocatori di secondo piano in un sistema globale dominato dagli asiatici, lontanamente più numerosi, intanto che i cinesi ci ridono sopra della guerra tra "l'Occidente" e gli arabi per determinare chi vendrà al loro le materie prime, energia in testa, per lo sviluppo industriale attraverso il quale verrebbero a dominare su tutti.

In tutto questo contesto, al livello personale di uno che, in qualche maniera, fa parte di quella classe media che si sta diminuendo in numero ed in importanza, almeno rispetto alla società dei paesi di prima industrializzazione durante gli ultimi cent'anni più o meno, direi che i rischi e le opportunità – sia in termini di mera soppravivenza, sia in termini economici generali, sia in termini di scelte morali personali – non sono molto differenti rispetto a situazioni sociali analoghe del passato. Sto pensando in particolare dell'Impero Romano dei primi due secoli rispetto a terzo secolo, per esempio. Comunque spesso nella storia c'è la lamentela della sparizione di una sorte di classe media o altra. Apparentemente i destini dell'umanità non si giocano all'intorno su questo punto, ci sono cose più importanti, anche al livello individuale. Nonostante, mi ricordo sempre qualcosa che ho letto rispetto all storia egiziana, una lettera di un padre scritto ad un figlio, conservata nelle sabbie del deserto, proprio durante l'alba della storia scritta, in cui esorta al figlio che diventi una scriba, cioè che sappia leggere e scrivere, che conosca le lingue, perchè tale conoscenza gli darebbe le capacità e la flessibilità di sopravvivere nel mondo dei grandi gruppi di potere, dei faraoni, vecchi e nuovi.

Pace dell'anima a tutti.

Latin & Hellas ™

4-5 gennaio 2006